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NOTES
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS OF
FACT: THE DOCTRINE OF JURISDICTIONAL FACTS
IN FLORIDA
Underlying many recent Florida cases of review of administrative
decisions is the concept of jurisdictional facts. An implied constitutional
prohibition of the delegation of legislative powers requires that a limited
jurisdiction, a controlled discretion, be granted to the administrative
agencies employed to make a law effective in varying factual situations.
In the creating statute particular requirements must be set out to control
the actions of the agency;' these requirements are jurisdictional, and
compliance therewith is a condition precedent to a valid exercise of the
granted authority. The doctrine of jurisdictional facts has been imple-
mented by the due process requirement that the allegations of statutory
or constitutional authority underlying the particular order or the par-
ticular rule be based on findings or conclusions of fact that are in turn
supported by the evidentiary facts in the record to at least a substantial
degree. In many Florida cases there is a tendency to homogenize these
concepts in the term "jurisdictional facts."2
I. THE OCCUPATIoNAL BoARDs
The present concept of jurisdictional facts has resulted from a mer-
ger of the principles governing review of executive suspension of officers
with the prinicples governing quasi-judicial determinations of the Rail-
road Commission. The importance of this blending of concepts can best
be shown by tracing the development of these principles in Florida law.
In 1892 the Court held that the Senate was the only power that
could judge the propriety of the suspension of an officer under the con-
stitutional grant of power to the Governor. In so far as the judiciary was
concerned, he was the exclusive judge of the sufficiency of the proof of
the charge, but the Court could inquire to determine whether the grounds
'A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
'The scope of this note is an examination of the origin and extent of the doctrine of
"jurisdictional facts" in Florida. For the common-law history of the doctrine see
Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson, JudiccJ Review of Administrative Determinations of
Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. oz PA. L. Rzv. 1055 (1932).
E 86 ]
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alleged in support of the suspension were among those set forth in the
Constitution.3 In 1931 the right to continue in office was recognized as
falling within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States, but at the same time the office-holder was
regarded as subject to suspension for the causes enumerated in Article 4,
Section 15, of the Florida Constitution as long as the Governor took the
required measures to acquire jurisdiction. Further, there is no con-
stitutional right to notice, to a hearing of the charges, or to a trial as in a
court of justice4 as far as the action of the Governor is concerned; the
trial is adequately furnished by the Senate.* In 1932, in Bryan v. Landis
ex rel. Reeve,6 this principle of law as to the exercise of power by the
executive was applied to the exercise of power by the City Commission
of Miami in removing an officer after the notice, charges, and hearing
required by statute. In this case the Court held that it would examine
the jurisdictional facts relied upon as a basis for the exercise of the
power. In other words: Did the Commission track the statute?
In the other line of cases the special consideration accorded the Rail-
road Commission by the Florida Constitution and by statute should be
kept in mind. The Commission is expressly permitted judicial powers by
Article V, Section 35, and by statute "all presumptions shall be in favor
of every action of the Commissioners."7  This presumption alone will
not sustain an order; there must be substantial evidence to support the
findings of fact as a basis for issuing an order.8 If the order is "without
a legally sufficient evidentiary basis," it is invalid.9 In State ex rel.
Williams v. Whitman'° an order of revocation of license by the Florida
State Board of Dental Examiners was reviewed, and the Court, relying
in part upon Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Commissioners,1" al-
lowed relief. Quasi-legislative and quasi-executive functions were dis-
tinguished. In these latter the courts will not review for mere errors of
'State ex rel. Lamar v. Johnson, 30 Fla. 433, 11 So. 845 (1892).
'State ex rel. Hatton v. Joughin, 103 Fla. 877, 138 So. 392 (1931).
'fr.A CoNsT. Art. IV, §1.
1106 Fla. 19, 142 So. 680 (1932).
'FLA. STAT. §350.12(m) (1941).
'Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876 (1930);
State v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 90 Fla. 721, 106 So. 576 (1925).
'State ex rel. Railroad Coim'n v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 77 Fla. 366, 81 So.
498 (1919).
"'116 Fla. 196, 156 So. 708 (1934).
11100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876 (1930).
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procedure or erroneous conclusions of fact when the record in its entirety
does not show an "abuse of the delegated authority, or arbitrary or un-
reasonable action." In quasi-judicial proceedings, however, relief will be
granted when the decision is improvident, erroneous, or unjustified, pro-
vided it divests or impairs some vested legal right.
The decision emphasizes that, consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment, a statutory tribunal such as the Board of Dental Examiners
may be permitted to make a final determination of license revocation for
legal causes if the Legislature so desires, but that if the testimony "en-
tirely fails to support charges that alone constitute legal ground for revo-
cation or deprivation of vested legal rights" relief may be obtained by
mandamus. Actually the question was one of law rather than of fact;
had the law been as the Board held, the admitted facts were sufficient.
In so far as review of the facts was concerned, the classifications made
were unnecessary.
In 1942, in Nelson v. Lindsey,12 which arose by mandamus against
a Miami board on behalf of a demoted policeman, reliance upon the
Whitman case was predicated upon headnotes stating the classification
made. The Court held that the action was essentially "administrative or
quasi-judicial," and that Article VIII, Section 8, of the Florida Consti-
tution, delegating powers to municipalities, "does not contemplate arbi-
trary municipal authority or action." The two headnotes were inter-
mingled in such a way as to produce the decision that the Court must
determine whether there had been "a legal and reasonable exercise of
administrative judgment predicated upon required procedure and appro-
priate evidence as shown by the record as made" or whether there had
been "an abuse of delegated authority or arbitrary or unreasonable ac-
tion." Then, upon review of the evidence it held that the order "is not
justified."
Thus, by 1942, when a Miami Civil Service Board's demotion of an
officer was reviewed in Hammond v. Curry,'3 there were two lines of
cases: Bryan v. Landis,14 interpreting the acts in the light of executive
power, and Nelson v. Lindsey,' 5 in the light of quasi-judicial, somewhat
diffused with quasi-executive and quasi-legislative powers. The majority
opinion by Justice Thomas chose the principle from the quasi-judicial
line of cases and held that tracking the statute and stating jurisdictional
2'151 FIa. 596, 10 So.2d 131 (1942).
1 153 Fla. 245, 14 So.2d 390 (1943).
1"10 6 Fla. 19, 142 So. 650 (1932).
1115 1 Fla. 596, 10 So.2d 131 (1942).
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causes is not enough. Without substantial evidence there is "an abuse of
delegated authority or arbitrary or unreasonable action." The dissent
by Chief Justice Buford, Justices Brown and Sebring concurring, said
that there was no conflict between the Nelson case and the Bryan case,
since both held that ". . 'jurisdictional facts' must be shown and
not that allegations of 'jurisdictional cause' only are required." The
courts may determine whether there is "an utter failure to prove the
alleged conduct which would establish the required jurisdictional facts."
Particularly important is his designation of exactly what he means by
jurisdictional facts.
"Jurisdictional facts are not established until a charge of misconduct
sufficient to constitute jurisdictional cause is made and the charge so
made is proved by some substantial evidence or admitted to be true." He
then added that because the majority weighed the evidence he dissented.
Particular emphasis must be given to this decision, inasmuch as later
cases indicate that there was no divergence in law, but rather in the
interpretation of the facts. In State ex rel. Hawkins v. McCall,'6 a case
involving a police officer in Jacksonville, the Court by Justice Buford
held, in reversing the order, that jurisdictional facts were neither alleged
nor shown by evidence. In this Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Ter-
rell and Chapman concurred. These were three of the majority in Ham-
mond v. Curry. In Becker v. Merrill,1 7 however, the opinion written by
Justice Thomas, who wrote the majority opinion in Hammond v. Curry,
retains the same terminology there used, while the opinion on rehearing,
written by Justice Brown, who dissented in Hammond v. Curry, uses the
same language. From this it appears that it depends on the writer of
the opinion which terms shall be applied, although the results are the
same.
This development of jurisdictional facts is important in these cases,
for the laws creating the civil service boards provided that their decisions
of fact should be final.1 8 Accepting this, the Court evolved a rule for
review that permitted examination of jurisdictional facts-procedural
due process. Surprisingly enough, when the validity of this provision
was raised in Becker v. Merrill,'9 the Court answered it by the Fifth
1158 Fla. 655, 29 So.2d 739 (1947).
17155 Fla. 379, 20 So.2d 912 (1945).
"1Becker v. Merrill, 155 Fla. 379, 20 So2d 912 (1945); Hammond v. Curry, 153
Fla. 245, 14 So.2d 390 (1943); Nelson v. Lindsey, 151 Fla. 596, 10 So.2d 131 (1942).
"1455 Fa. 379, 20 So.2d 912 (1945).
4
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Amendment to the United States Constitution2o and by Section 12 of
the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution. At all events, the
Court has refused to sanction the express creation of spheres of activity
for administrative boards beyond the reach of the judiciary, upon whose
functioning the citizen relies to insure proper treatment.
II. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Industrial Commission, created by the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, 2 ' has been the board most involved in litigation. For the pur-
poses of Florida law, when it is fulfilling its duties of adjusting compen-
sation it is merely an administrative agent for the purpose of taking testi-
mony whenever an appeal is taken from its findings. 2 2 Since an applica-
tion of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,23 its findings are
given "about the same weight and consideration which the chancellor
should properly give to the findings of law and fact by a special master
appointed by the court for that purpose." 2 4  But, if those same findings
are affirmed by the circuit court, they have the same weight as the
chancellor's findings in other cases. 2 -  The circuit court must consider
the case on the record 2 6 and does so even to the consideration of service
of process. 2 7 Some indication has been given that the findings should
carry weight by a holding that "the rule is well established that their
award will be upheld if there is substantial testimony before them." 28
A later case,2 9 however, severely limited the effect of this decision by
giving no weight at all to the findings of the Commission on conflicting
testimony, thus aborting the attempt to elevate the Commission's stand-
ing in court.
2 The Court must have meant the Fourteenth Amendment; the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment applies only to the Federal Government. Chapin
v. Fye, 179 U. S. 127 (1900).
2 1FLA. STAT. §440.44 (1941).
"2Conversely, its orders are binding judgments when the time for appeal has
passed.
"aFirestone Auto Supply & Serv. Stores v. Bullard, 141 Fla. 282, 192 So. 865 (1940).
241d. at 286, 192 So. at 866.
"'Florida Forest & Park Serv. v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472, 19 So.2d 251 (1944).
2Ibid.
"7 Anderson v. Jarrell, 157 Fla. 212, 25 So.2d 490 (1946).
2"McCall v. Motor Fuel Carriers, Inc., 155 Fla. 854, 22 So.2d 153 (1945).
"Star Fruit Co. v. Canady, 32 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1947).
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The wisdom of treating the Industrial Commission as an unhappy
stepchild of the courts is not here in question, nor is the validity of the
statutory interpretation that made it so; the Legislature has lent its
acceptance to the interpretation by its silence on this part of the act fol-
lowing these decisions.3 0
III. QUAsI-LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Here the question is not- ordinarily one of jurisdiction but rather of
an abuse of authority. An interesting treatment of the problem of-review
is found in McRae v. Robbins.3 ' A price-fixing order was held subject
to review by injunction, since it was alleged to be unreasonable and con-
fiscatory to the plaintiff. The concurring opinion of 'Justice Whitfield
held that in the absence of a record of the evidence and findings the order
was without legal effect, because it violated due process in procedure and
was unsupported by evidence. This suggests that such orders are sub-
ject to attack on the basis of procedure, reasonableness, and the suffici-
ency of the evidence. The complaining party may allege a non-compli-
ance with the statute or an arbitrary or unreasobable order as the basis
for review.3 2 But Justice Whitfield stated that for review there must
be a record of the evidence and findings.3 3 Did he mean that there
could not be a later presentation of any pertinent evidence to the Court,
irrespective of whether it was before the board at the time of its find-
ings? On the question of substantive due process-the reasonableness of
an order promulgated by proper procedure-such evidence outside the
record should not be permitted as long as procedurally the complainant
could have presented it for the record.3 4 The majority opinion, how-
ever, by permitting an original action in equity, allowed this extra-record
evidence in all aspects, both procedural and substantive. The dissent
took the view that this was error, and that the complainant should have
been limited to certiorari for a review of the existing record.
"Cf. 1 U. or FLA. L. REv. 465 (1948).
*1151 Fla. 109, 9 So.2d 284 (1942).
!'State ex rel. West Flagler Amusement Co. v. Rose, 122 Fla. 227, 16S So. 60
(1935).
"There is some confusion of the concepts involved in this quasi-legislative order
with those involved in quasi-judicial proceedings. Justice Whitfield apparently de-
sired that this type of action be taken under many of the same precautions as those
in a court of record.
"Sce In re Grubb, 116 Fla 387, 156 So. 482 (1934).
6
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The Court has not always been so divided. There has been a free
use of the writ of mandamus to review quasi-legislative orders. The or-
der is deemed prima facie reasonable and justified unless the facts as
shown require a conclusion to the contrary. 3 5 Upon a petition for an
alternative writ the board may answer and present evidence to sustain its
order, and the relator may present any pertinent evidence to prove that
the statute has not been followed 3 6 or that the order is unreasonable.
3 7
IV. TiE RAILROAD COMMISSION
The Railroad Commission occupies a secure position by virtue of a
presumption in favor of its jurisdiction and of the reasonableness of its
orders; in fact, "all presumptions shall be in favor of every action of the
commissioners."38 This presumption alone will not sustain an order,
however, because there must be substantial evidence to support the find-
ings of fact as a basis for issuing the order.3 9 In spite of the presump-
tion and some slight amount of evidence, the order may be invalid as
unreasonable 4 o or without "a legally sufficient evidentiary basis." 41
The denial or issuance of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity after a public hearing involves a quasi-judicial function. 4 2
Public convenience and necessity must be affirmatively established by
substantial evidence and duly found by the Commission therefrom; other-
wise the Commission is without authority to issue or deny the certifi-
cate.4 3 Unless the entire proceedings are in the record, a writ of review
will be denied unless the Commission's order is illegal on its face, even
though the writ sought be mandamus. 4 4 In treating with the Railroad
Commission, then, even though it has been given every organic and
statutory aid to the finality of its findings, the Court has consistently fol-
"'State ex rel. Hollywood Jockey Club, Inc. v. Stein, 129 Fla. 777, 176 So. 849
(1937).
"State ex rel. West Flagler Amusement Co. v. Rose, 122 Fla. 227, 165 So. 60
(1935).
"State ex rel. Hollywood jockey Club, Inc. v. Stein, 129 Fla. 777, 176 So.
849 (1937); accord State v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 48 Fla. 152, 37 So. 658 (1904).
'"FLA. STAT. §350.12(m) (1941).
"Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876 (1930).
"State v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 90 Fla. 721, 106 So. 576 (1925).
"State v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 77 Fla. 366, 81 So. 498 (1919).
"Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876 (1930).
"Leonard Bros. Transfer & Stg. Co. v. Douglass, 32 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1947).
"In re Grubb, 116 Fla. 387, 156 So. 482 (1934).
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lowed the rules for review of the decisions of lower courts, perhaps be-




The review of findings of fact in all these cases, with the exception
of the Industrial Commission, consists of an evaluation of the evidence
in the light of the controlling law; if there is substantial evidence as a
basis for the findings, the Court will refrain from weighing the evidence
or comparing it with the evidence offered in refutation. 46 Substantial
evidence is "evidence which supports a substantial basis of fact from
which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. It must do more than
create a suspicion of the fact to be established, and must be such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."' 47 Its effect upon review was stated in Nelson v. State
ex rel. Quigg:4s
"We have held, and it seems to be the almost universal rule
that the findings of fact made by an administrative board, bureau,
or commission in compliance with law, will not be disturbed on
appeal if such findings are sustained by substantial evidence. ....
This rule finds its counterpart in, if indeed it is not the twin broth-
er of, the rule which requires an appellate court to give great
weight to the findings of fact made by a jury or chancellor and
to sustain such findings unless there is no substantial evidence to
support them."
VI. CONCLUSION
The jurisdictional authority of the administrative agency will, of
course, be checked. The courts will examine the evidence adduced to
support a rule or order of such agency. If the evidence is not substantial,
relief will be granted; but if it is substantial it will not be re-weighed on
'"FLA. CONsT. Art. V, §35.
"Becker v. Merrill, 155 Fla. 379, 20 So.2d 912 (1944).
'"Becker v. Merrill, 155 Fla. 379, 20 So.2d 912 (1944) and cases cited; Laney
v. Board of Public Instruction, 153 Fla. 728, 15 So.2d 748 (1943).
's156 Fla. 189, 23 So.2d 136 (1934).
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